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SLIPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS:
HOW DIGITAL MUSIC STREAMING
CUTS CORNERS ON ARTISTS&
ROYALTY REVENUES GLOBALLY
INTRODUCTION
t a time when the digital delivery of music is becoming a
larger percentage of the music business, demand for music
is at an all-time high.1 In today’s digital eraO certain categories
of income streams have taken a predominant role in artists’ royL
alty monies as digital musical consumption and income have
steadily increased in the past decade.2 Sound recording perfor-
mance rights, or “neighbouring rightsO”3 which compensate the
master holder of the song4 and the artist when music is publicly
1. Hannah Ellis-Peterson, Streaming Growth Helps Digital Music Reve-
nues Surpass Physical Sales, GUARDIAN (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/music/2016/apr/12/streaming-revenues-bring-big-boost-to-global-mu-
sic-industry.
2. Digital streaming has grown to produce substantial revenue in recent
years. See Anabelle Gauberti,Neighbouring Rights in the Digital Era: How the
Music Industry Can Cash In, COPYRIGHTTRADEMARKL.BLOG, LEXISNEXIS (Oct.
26, 2016), https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/intellectual-prop-
erty/b/copyright-trademark-law-blog/archive/2015/10/26/neighbouring-rights-
in-the-digital-era-how-the-music-industry-can-cash-inKaspSK In factO “while
recorded music sales of physical products have declined 66 percent since their
high in 1999, revenues from overall neighbouring rights have increased dra-
maticallyO reaching Euros :KI98 billion globally in :I<9K” Id.
3. Beighbouring rights are the rights that “neighbour” the copyright in the
musical composition. See George Howard, Neighboring Rights: What They Are
and Why They Matter, TUNE CORE (July 19, 2012),
http://www.tunecore.com/blog/2012/07/neighboring-rights-what-they-are-why-
they-matter.html. Unfortunately, only artists who are residents in signatory
countries to the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers
of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations of 1961 (collectively, the
“Rome Convention”P are eligible to receive these royaltiesK Id. Most notably,
the United States is not on this list. Id.
4. Typically, an artist who has signed a record deal with a record label re-
lin'uishes their “master rights” in a sound recording to the record label itself.
See Keith Hatschek, Retaining Your Master Rights is Smart Business, DISC
MAKERS BLOG (Apr. 16, 2013), http://blog.discmakers.com/2013/04/retaining-
your-master-rights-smart-business/. This means that, in such a scenario, the
artist no longer retains the rights to their sound recordings. Id. Record labels
get away with this because they provide most of the funding for the recording
process and release of the record. Id.
A
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performed, have implicitly become a growing source of revenue
for artists as digital streaming has surged.5 Ten countries, how-
ever, control 82 percent of worldwide royalties through the
neighbouring rights market, with the United States at the top of
the list (28 percent), closely followed by the United Kingdom (12
percent) and France (11 percent).6
Music streaming services appeal to people across the globe be-
cause one can simply pay a flat monthly fee7 for an unlimited
amount of music they do not actually own, as opposed to paying
for individual tracks from providers like iTunes.8 The appeal is
that users can stream more music than they would have if they
had to pay for each individual track. The problem, however, is
that even the globe’s most popular digital service providersO such
as Spotify9 and Rhapsody,10 often choose expediency over li-
censes by selling music to subscribers without either negotiating
direct licenses (obtained directly from the copyright holder)11 or
5. Gauberti, supra note 2.
6. The top ten markets and the percentage of the royalties they control
worldwide are as follows: The United States (28 percent), the United Kingdom
(12 percent), France (11 percent), Japan (7 percent), Germany (7 percent), Ar-
gentina (3 percent), the Netherlands (3 percent), Canada (2 percent), and Nor-
way (2 percent). See id.
7. See Sarah Mitroff, Spotify, Apple Music, Radio and Rhapsody: Which
Music Streaming App Is Right For You?, CNET (Apr. 7, 2016),
https://www.cnet.com/how-to/best-music-streaming-service/.
8. ITUNES, http://www.apple.com/itunes/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2017). In re-
cent years, even providers like iTunes that offer the sale of individual tracks
have =umped on the streaming trendO where “Even Apple?whose pay-per-song
iTunes once seemed like the future?has doubled-down on iTunes Radio, its
music-streaming Pandora competitorK” Ben TaylorO By the Numbers: The
6&(F_0A/C K%'AJ 1_( X_/H 1B.’' 1A//A/CV, TIME (Aug. 14, 2014),
http://time.com/3109273/streaming-music-services-compared/.
9. SPOTIFY, https://www.spotify.com/us/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
10. NAPSTER, http://us.napster.com (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
11. One must first obtain permission to reproduce, perform, or distribute a
copyrighted work from the copyright owner himself?known as a “direct liL
censeK” Rich Stim, Copyright and Compulsory Licenses, NOLO,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/copyright-compulsory-license.html
(last visited Jan. 16, 2017). There are other circumstances, however, when one
may utiliRe a copyrighted work without the copyright owner’s permissionO so
long as the relevant legal rules are followed and fees are paid?known as a
“compulsory licenseK” Id. Music companies and webcasters are among those
who use compulsory licenses most frequently. Id. The United States Copyright
2ffice sets a statutory “Mechanical Royalty RateO” which one must abide by
and pay out to the copyright holder, along with sending notice of their use of
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pursuing compulsory licenses (obtained without express permis-
sion from the copyright holder).12 This issue has caused big name
artists, such as Taylor Swift, Adele, and several others, to fa-
mously withhold their music from digital streaming services,
such as Spotify, for fear their art is being devalued.13 This has
created a challenging atmosphere for often exploited artists,
making it more important now than ever before for artists to re-
ceive the credit they deserve.14
One legal tool available to exploited artists that gives them the
ability to advocate for themselves and similarly situated artists
is to challenge the major digital providers through class action
lawsuits.15 In a class action lawsuit, an individual or a small
group of individuals can represent and bring a suit on behalf of
a large group.16 In the past decade, artists who have been ex-
ploited by powerful digital streaming websites have used class
action lawsuits to protect their musical works, ensuring that
they receive appropriate royalties and credit for their composi-
tions.17
the copyright to the copyright holder if they plan on obtaining a compulsory
license. Id.
12. See id.; Spotify Settles $43 Million Class Action Copyright Lawsuit,
FORBES (June 1, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalentertain-
ment/2017/06/01/spotify-settles-43-million-class-action-copyright-law-
suit/#20e5b36a1e3f [hereinafter FORBES]; In the United States, in 1998, as part
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Congress extended the § 114 compul-
sory license to include webcasting and amended § 112 of the Act to cover the
server copies necessary for digital transmissions, enabling webcasters like
Spotify and Rhapsody to pursue compulsory licenses. SeeU.S. COPYRIGHTOFF.,
COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE 75@77 (2015), http://www.copy-
right.gov/policy/musiclicensingstudy/copyright-and-the-music-market-
place.pdf [hereinafter U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF.].
13. See Charlotte Hassan, Reasons Why Some Artist Absolutely Hate
6+.&ADZL, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.digitalmu-
sicnews.com/2016/03/21/why-artists-pull-their-music-from-spotify-but-not-
youtube/.
14. U.S. COPYRIGHTOFF., supra note 12, at 18.
15. See FORBES, supra note 12.
16. Class Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdiction-
ary.org/class-action/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2016).
17. For recent case law in which a group of individuals brought a class ac-
tion on behalf of themselves and similarly-situated holders of mechanical
rights in copyrighted musical works used without first obtaining a license, see
FORBES, supra note 12.
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It is only within the past three years, however, that major Eu-
ropean powers, like the United Kingdom18 and France,19 with
the enactment of the Consumer Rights Act (CRA)20 and the Loi
Hamon,21 respectively, have adopted this predominantly United
States phenomenon of class action litigation into their legal sys-
tems. The problem, however, is that class action lawsuits prove
to be more restrictive in scope under U.K. and French law. Only
those with material damages22 can bring suit, which are some-
thing artists exploited by digital streamers often cannot estab-
lish.23 Further, class action laws are so new in the United King-
dom and France that there are doubts as to their effectiveness,
as class action litigation has rarely been utilized since their en-
actment.24 Since the United Kingdom and France are two of the
countries with the highest concentration of the neighbouring
rights market, ranking only behind the United States,25 it is im-
perative for artists in the United Kingdom and France to utilize
this tool. Artists must band together to bring action against
18. The United Kingdom enacted The Consumer Rights Act 2015 on October
1, 2015. See Collective Actions: UK Guide, ASHURST (July 26, 2017),
https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-insights/legal-updates/quickguides?-
collective-actions/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2017); Clive Coleman, US-Style Class
Actions Introduced in UK, BBC (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
34402483.
19. France enacted the Loi Hamon on March 17, 2014. See Introduction of
Class Actions in France: A Growing Threat to Professionals?, LATHAM &
WATKINS (Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-france-
class-action-law [hereinafter LATHAM&WATKINS].
20. See Collective Actions: UK Guide, supra note 18.
21. The Loi Hamon was enacted in March of 2014 and entered into force on
October 1, 2014. See LATHAM&WATKINS, supra note 19.
22. Class action litigation in France is limited to services provided, sales of
products, and damages caused by unfair competition. See Von Emmanuel
Brouquier, Class Actions in France—What You Need to Know, GEN RE (May
21, 2015), http://de.genre.com/knowledge/blog/class-actions-in-france-what-
you-need-to-know.html; LATHAM&WATKINS, supra note 19.
23. Since 2ctober <O :I<8O when the “Famon” law entered into forceO only
six class actions have been brought. See Lionel Lesur, French Class Action Has
Less Impact Than Expected, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Feb. 9, 2016),
https://www.mwe.com/en/thought-leadership/publications/2016/02/french-
class-action-law-has-less-impact.
24. See id.; Molly Herron, UK Competition Class Action Regime Out of the
Starting Blocks, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (July 22, 2016), https://www.her-
bertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/uk-competition-class-action-regime-
out-of-the-starting-blocks.
25. See Gauberti, supra note 2.
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global providers, such as Spotify and Rhapsody, who dominate
the digital market.26
This Note argues that the restrictiveness of the class action
regimes in the United Kingdom and France are posing a disser-
vice to artists who are not being credited for their musical com-
positions.27 Part I of this Note will provide a brief outline of the
digital music marketplace in the twenty-first century,28 the in-
fluential role of digital music providers,29 and why it is im-
portant for them to ensure artists are credited for their compo-
sitions. Part I will also discuss the role that the top three play-
ers30 in neighbouring rights revenues pose in the digital music
marketplace, which is now dominated by online streaming ser-
vices. Part II will provide an overview of the class action system
in the United States, identify the costs and benefits to class ac-
tion litigation as a tool for artists in the United States, and detail
how artists in the United Kingdom and France could benefit
from a more effective class action system.31 Part III will provide
an overview of the current state of group litigation in the United
Kingdom, the significant changes introduced by this new regime,
and how artists are still limited in the types of claims they can
bring, even with the passage of the CRA.32 Part IV will provide
26. Digital revenues now account for 46 percent of total music industry rev-
enuesO where four of the world’s top ten markets’ digital channels account for
the majority of revenues. SeeGauberti, supra note 2; Ellis-Peterson, supra note
1.
27. The United Kingdom and France have limited the type of litigants who
can bring a group claimO restricting eSploited artists’ ability to bring themK See
Collective Actions: UK Guide, supra note 18; LATHAM & WATKINS, supra note
19.
28. See generally Brittany Alexandra Buckley, Digital Takeover: The Real-
ity of Music in the Twenty First Century (2012) (unpublished SPEA Under-
graduate Honors thesis, Indiana University), https://spea.indiana.edu/doc/un-
dergraduate/ugrd_thesis2012_bsam_buckley.pdf; Alex Beram, Selling Music
in the 21st Century, MUSIC BUS. J. BERKLEE COLLEGE OF MUSIC (Jan. 2009),
http://www.thembj.org/2009/01/selling-music-in-the-21st-century/.
29. See Andre Evren, T(_JA/C &BF MA'&.(Z .D K%'AJ 6&(F_0A/CT _/H 1BZ I&’'
More Important Now Than Ever, BIT OF NEWS (June 17, 2015),
http://news.bitofnews.com/tracing-the-history-of-music-streaming-and-why-
its-more-important-now-than-ever/.
30. The top three players in the neighbouring rights marketplace are the
United States, the United Kingdom, and France. See Gauberti, supra note 2.
31. Especially since the United Kingdom and France are two of the world’s
largest markets for neighbouring rights, it is imperative for their legal struc-
tures to encompass a remedy for exploited artists. See id.
32. See Collective Actions: UK Guide, supra note 18.
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an overview of the current law and state of group litigation in
France, the major differences between French and U.S. class ac-
tion laws, and how the crucial differences in the French law af-
fect exploited artists in France.33 Finally, Part V will propose a
solution, which calls for the United Kingdom and France to take
steps towards following the U.S. class action model34 by reform-
ing their current legislation through passing an amendment or
adopting new legislation entirely.
I. THEDIGITALMUSICMARKETPLACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY
This Part will examine the digital music marketplace in the
twenty-first century. It will also explain the influential role of
digital music providers and why it is imperative for artists to
have legal recourse when they are not receiving adequate royal-
ties.
A. What is the Digital Music Marketplace in the Twenty-first
Century and Who Are the Major Players?
There is no doubt that music is an integral part of society.35
When artists share their creativity and musical ideas, however,
they are entitled to compensation.36 It is also apparent that dig-
ital music streaming is on the rise, as digital revenues now ac-
count for 45 percent of total music industry revenues and
streaming proves to be the industry’s fastest growing revenue
source.37 While technology progresses and continues to develop,
33. See LATHAM&WATKINS, supra note 19.
34. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
35. Music has even been referred to as the “greatest creation of manO” as it
has therapeutic effects, such as reducing stress, improving sleep quality, and
enhancing blood level function. See George Rachiotis, The Importance of Music
in Our Daily Lives, TRUTH INSIDE OF YOU (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.truthin-
sideofyou.org/importance-of-music-daily-lives/; Not So Fair After All—Interna-
tional Aspects of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, 14 TRANSNAT’L L.
435, 436 (2001) [hereinafter TRANSNAT’L L.]; Scott Christ, 20 Surprising, Sci-
ence-Backed Health Benefits of Music, GREATIST (Dec. 12, 2013),
http://greatist.com/happiness/unexpected-health-benefits-music.
36. See TRANSNAT’L L., supra note 35, at 436.
37. At the close of 2015, the International Federation of the Phonographic
Industry (IFPI), a not-for-profit international organization that represents rec-
ord labels globally, reported total industry global revenues at 39 percent phys-
ical format sales, 45 percent digital revenues, 14 percent performance rights,
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the physical and digital world will continue to intertwine.38
Scholars note that the 2001 release of the iPod was a pivotal
transition into the digital music era that is undergoing a perpet-
ual evolution into the digital future, stating that:
We quickly moved from bulky Sony Walkmans, to the click-
wheel iPods with mini-hard drives, to now having flash
memory. CDs, the previously disruptive technology that sent
vinyl albums into the dustbin of history, were quickly displaced
by digital music files and portable music players. This transi-
tion in our culture from a physical to a digital world has oc-
curred at an impressive, if not dizzying, pace. From
smartphone apps to digital music streaming services, our world
has replaced the tangible and the analog with the digital.39
Music streaming has greatly evolved since the inception of the
internet.40 Napster, the first streaming on-demand music sub-
scription service offering unlimited access to a large music data-
base for a flat monthly fee, launched in 1999, quickly becoming
the fastest growing business ever, holding records over Google
and Facebook.41 Although peer-to-peer music sharing previously
existed on the web, Napster made it easier than ever for users
to access one massive marketplace and predicted the success
other digital music streaming providers could have in the fu-
ture.42 Napster did, however, experience the same difficulties
music streaming providers do today, where they had to amass
extensive music libraries to offer to subscribers in a short
amount of time, which resulted in adding music to its service
without ac'uiring proper licensesKMaking Bapster’s music race
and 2 percent synchronization rights. See An Explosion in Global Music Con-
sumption Supported by Multiple Platforms, IFPI (Sept. 13, 2016),
http://www.ifpi.org/facts-and-stats.php.
38. For example, most of the buttons on smart phones are now 0virtual’ icons
on a screen, rather than physical, mechanical objects. See Timothy R. Holbrook
& Lucas S. Osborn, Digital Patent Infringement in an Era of 3D Printing, 48
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319, 1321 (2015).
39. See id. at 1321.
40. In 1990, the online world took its most recognizable form when Tim
Berners-Lee invented the World Wide Web. See Evan Andrews, Who Invented
the Internet?, HISTORY (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.history.com/news/ask-his-
tory/who-invented-the-internet.
41. See Evren, supra note 29; GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (last visited
Oct. 18, 2017); FACEBOOK, https://facebook.com (last visited Jan. 16, 2017)
[hereinafter FACEBOOK].
42. See Evren, supra note 29.
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even more difficult, record labels were hesitant to grant licenses
because they could not find a way to make the services profita-
ble.43 Napster inevitably met its demise just two years after its
emergence, as it was crushed by lawsuits for copyright viola-
tion.44
Since the creation of Napster, companies buying into the music
streaming race have developed Napster spinoffs, utilizing the
large music database for a fixed monthly fee concept, ranging
from the current players, such as Pandora internet radio, to
Spotify’s music streaming serviceK45 The major complaint, how-
ever, with all of the music streaming service providers, is that
artists are receiving dismal royalties, while the providers often
choose to play now and pay later when they provide songs on
their servers that they have not acquired proper licenses for.46 It
is Apple’s nearly half-a-trillion-dollar industry,47 however, that
has facilitated the international music streaming race in the
past decade.48
The iPod opened the doors to digital music streaming because,
although it was not the first music player,49 the iPod was the
43. See id.
44. Althoughmany artists did not have any clear response towards Napster,
some artists publicly commented in favor of the service, while their record la-
bels quietly attempted to have their music removed from it. See Evren, supra
note 29.
45. MusicNet launched right after Bapster’s collapseO providing a new serL
vice where users could pay a monthly subscription fee to access a large data-
base of music. See Evren, supra note 29. MusicNet was defeated by its fee that
gave 91 percent of the profits to record labels, leaving performers with a frac-
tion of a penny per play. Id. Pandora Radio launched in 2004, creating person-
alized music radio stations. Id. Only 5 percent of users, however, actually pay
for the $10 USD a month uninterrupted streaming, where the remaining 95
percent listen for free (though interrupted by occasional advertisements). Id.
It was Spotify’s launch that finally had something most comparable to BapL
ster’s serviceK Id. Its service, however, is concerning to many people, as it pro-
motes the shift away from music ownership. Id.
46. See Evren, supra note 29.
47. As of May 2016, Apple has a market cap of around $495 billion USD. See
Paul Monica, Google is Worth More than Apple, CNN MONEY (May 12, 2016),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/12/investing/apple-google-alphabet-most-valua-
ble/.
48. See Evren, supra note 29.
49. Music devices have transformed in the past fifty years. See Music Device
Timeline, TIMETOAST TIMELINES, https://www.timetoast.com/timelines/music-
device-timeline (last visited Oct. 16, 2016). From the invention of the cassette
in 1971, to the Walkman in 1979, the compact disk in 1982, the discman in
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first device to simplify synching with digital music collections on
personal computers.50 Premium international subscription ser-
vices, such as Spotify, Rhapsody, and YouTube,51 have seen a
dramatic expansion in subscribers since the data was first com-
piled in 2010.52 According to the International Federation of the
Phonographic Industry (IFPI),53 a not-for-profit international or-
ganization registered in Switzerland that represents the inter-
ests of the recording industry worldwide, there is an estimated
68 million people now paying a music subscription, compared to
48 million in 2014 and just 8 million in 2010.54 The subscription
value of streaming services of Spotify alone has reached $68 mil-
lion USD, a growth of 66 percent from 2014.55 Unfortunately, as
the amount of music consumption has risen, the gap between the
amount of music consumed and the cash earned by artists has
also increased.56
Competing to maintain its prominence in the consumer mar-
ket,57 it is no surprise that when international music streaming
became possible,58 Apple wanted to secure itself a spot in the
music streaming market, where music fans increasingly em-
brace subscriptions over pay-per-song services, such as iTunes.59
It is Spotify, however, that is the undisputed king of streaming
1984, the mp3 in 1997, and finally to the iPod in 2001. Id. The iPod has con-
tinued to dominate the music player scene, as more than 1 billion apple devices
are in active use around the world. Id.; Nick Statt, 1 Billion Apple Devices are
in Active Use Around the World, VERGE (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.thev-
erge.com/2016/1/26/10835748/apple-devices-active-1-billion-iphone-ipad-ios.
50. Apple Unveils New, Faster iPod Touch with Streaming Service in Mind,
BILLBOARD (July 15, 2015), http://www.billboard.com/articles/busi-
ness/6633593/new-ipod-touch-apple-music [hereinafter BILLBOARD].
51. YOUTUBE, www.youtube.com (last visited Oct. 3, 2017).
52. An Explosion in Global Music Consumption Supported by Multiple Plat-
forms, IFPI (Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.ifpi.org/facts-and-stats.php.
53. See IFPI, www.ifpi.org/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
54. See Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 38.
55. See Ellis-Peterson, supra note 1.
56. See id.
57. BILLBOARD, supra note 50.
58. Digital music streaming became possible after the invention of the in-
ternet in the early 1990s. See Evren, supra note 29.
59. In fact, Apple seems to always stay two years ahead of its competitors
in releasing products out into the physical and digital marketplace. See Tim
Bajarin, 6 Reasons Apple is so Successful, TIME (May 7, 2012), http://tech-
land.time.com/2012/05/07/six-reasons-why-apple-is-successful/; BILLBOARD,
supra note 50.
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music.60 Now in fifty-eight countries,61 Spotify has raised over
500 million USD, while its user base exceeds 50 million people
globally, with 12.5 million paying subscribers.62With such a pre-
dominant influence globally for a major streaming service, it is
highly concerning that it took Spotify two years to complete their
music licenses.63 HurtherO Spotify’s competitorsO like Rhapsody
(which recently bought a rebranded, fully licensed Napster),
Rdio,64 and Google Play Music65 pose a huge headache to record
labels, music publishers, and performing-rights societies strug-
gling to keep up with all of the current and emerging technolo-
gies to ensure artists are receiving royalties due.66
60. Spotify sits on its throne as king of music streaming:
With a reported paid user base surpassing 20 million sub-
scribers?not to mention an astronomical 55 million addi-
tional listeners on its free, ad-based service?the Swedish-
born service currently trounces its competition, most of which
boast a few million users at best. Its biggest competitor? Ap-
ple Music, a subscription-only service that, as of January
2016, is reported to have at least 10 million subscribers. Alt-
hough that is less than half the siRe of Spotify’s paying user
baseO it’s impressive when you consider the short time since
the platform’s release and Spotify’s substantial head startK
See Rick Stella & Brandon Widder, Spotify vs. Apple Music: Who Wins the Ul-
timate Streaming Showdown?, DIGITALTRENDS (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.dig-
italtrends.com/music/apple-music-vs-spotify/.
61. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France are among the list
of the fifty-eight countries where Spotify offers its services. See John Seabrook,
Revenue Streams: Is Spotify the Music I/H%'&(Z’' O(AF/H .( I&' O.F#, NEW
YORKER (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11/24/rev-
enue-streams. The list of participating countries is growing every day. Id. Can-
ada is the latest on the Spotify sceneO as Canada allowed Spotify’s services into
its country in September of 2016. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Rdio is the first modern music streaming service to arrive in the United
States. See Casey Newton, Why Rdio Died, VERGE (Nov. 17, 2015),
http://www.theverge.com/2015/11/17/9750890/rdio-shutdown-pandora.
65. GOOGLE PLAY MUSIC, https://play.google.com/music/lis-
ten?gclid=CPDf0Nj-x9ECFULxDQodzGQPTA&gclsrc=ds (last visited Jan. 16,
2017).
66. As John Seabrook explains:
With any given stream of a song there is a myriad of copy-
rights?performing and mechanical rights apply to both the
recording and the composition?which makes sorting out
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Providers
The United States seems to be the most innovative and influ-
ential music culture in the world.67 Artists from the United
Kingdom,68 howeverO have a prominent role in today’s internaL
tional music industry. In fact, in 2015, half of the top ten biggest-
selling artists worldwide were British.69 In an attempt to keep
up with music licensing and respect sound recordings, the
United Dingdom’s Phonographic Performance Ltd (PPL),70 the
United Dingdom’s collective rights organization, has compiled
over 5.6 million recordings released in the United Kingdom, en-
abling them to work with major record labels and a range of
overseas music licensing companies to include worldwide data.71
The PPL is not the only force in the United Kingdom taking ini-
tiative to protect its artists’ worksK72 The United Kingdom’s CopL
yright Hub73 is a resource for all, as it offers information about
copyright law and website links to licensing organizations in an
who’s owed what no easy matter K K K YouTubeO which is by far
the largest streaming-music site in the world Qit wasn’t deL
signed that way?that’s =ust what it became), is notorious
among rights holders in themusic industry for its measly and
erratic payouts.
See Seabrook, supra note 61.
67. Although the United States has the most innovative and influential mu-
sic culture in the world, its system for enabling the paid use of music?and
ensuring compensation for its creators?lags far behind. See U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFF. supra note 12, at 12.
68. The most notable musicians of all time are from the United Kingdom,
including The Beatles, The Rolling Stones, Led Zeppelin, David Bowie, Black
Sabbath, and The Who. See Bonnie Stirnberg, The 50 Best British Artists of All
Time, PASTE (Apr. 29, 2011), https://www.pastemaga-
zine.com/blogs/lists/2011/04/pastes-50-favorite-british-artists-of-all-
time.html.
69. In 2015, Adele, Ed Sheeran, One Direction, Coldplay and Sam Smith?
all British artists?were the top ten biggest-selling artists worldwide. See El-
lis-Peterson, supra note 1.
70. See Who We Are, PPLUK, http://www.ppluk.com/About-Us/Who-We-
Are/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2017).
71. PPLUK, http://www.ppluk.com (last visited Jan. 16, 2017).
72. See THE COPYRIGHT HUB, http://www.copyrighthub.co.uk (last visited
Jan. 16, 2017) [hereinafter COPYRIGHTHUB].
73. Id.
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attempt to make it easier for people, or music streaming ser-
vices, to track down and obtain licenses for copyrighted works.74
The PPL and Copyright Fub are vital to UKDK artists in today’s
era, where the U.K. market for recorded music has grown to £1.1
billion, with major record labels expecting sales in the coming
year to represent at least 40 percent of their revenue, putting
the United Kingdom at “the forefront of one of the largest marL
kets in Europe for the adoption of streaming as a means of lis-
tening to musicK”75
In France, as in most other developed nations, revenue from
physical music sales have taken a plunge, while subscription-
based audio streaming services have seen a leap in revenue.76
France deserves attention, not only because it is one of the larg-
est music markets in the world, but because it is home to Deezer,
the world’s second-largest music subscription service behind
Spotify, which is changing consumer behavior in its home mar-
ket.77Bow available in the United StatesO ZeeRer’s Hrench music
streaming service is another challenger in the ring with Pan-
dora, Spotify, Apple Music, and Tidal, as it is available at a flat
74. SeeU.S. COPYRIGHTOFF. supra note 12, at 65@66.
75. In the United Kingdom, listeners spend an average of thirteen hours per
month digitally streaming music. See Christian Harris, Why Streaming Ser-
vices Play a Vital Role in Building the New Music Economy, DRUM (Feb. 16,
2016), http://www.thedrum.com/opinion/2016/02/16/why-streaming-services-
play-vital-role-building-new-music-economy. The considerable amount of time
these users are spending on streaming sites has prompted advertisers to make
more of an effort to connect with such services, in hopes of gaining more visi-
bility and engaging with a connected audience. Id.
76. Subscription-based audio streaming services have grown from about
(98K4million Q+86K:million USZP to =ust under (84million Q+69K5million USZP
in recent years. See In France, Music Downloads Decline as Streaming Shows
Promise, EMARKETER (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.emarketer.com/Arti-
cle/France-Music-Downloads-Decline-Streaming-Shows-Promise/1012012.
77. Reporting a similar finding, Billboard released an article stating that
“Hrance’s digital music market posted a 6-percent gain last year. Streaming
revenue from subscription services like ZeeRer rose 97K: percentO to (84K8 milL
lion ($64.4 million USD). Ad-supported streaming grew 9:K: percent to (:8K<
million Q+9:K< million USZPK” See Glenn Peoples, French Report: Streaming
Revenues Grow in the Land of Deezer, But CS Still Dominate, BILLBOARD (Feb.
4, 2015), http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6458461/france-music-in-
dustry-revenue-streaming-revenues-grow-cds.
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monthly rate and provides access to over forty million music
tracks with six million users globally.78
Many music lovers are turning to subscription or ad-funded
streaming.79 Not only are the digital music streamers failing to
obtain all necessary licenses for each individual track, but
streaming, like many facets of digital and internet music distri-
bution, is failing to substantially pay artists.80 A growing num-
ber of artists have boycotted digital streaming services, as they
are increasingly worried about their income, or the lack
thereof.81 Songwriters’ concerns are vividly illustrated82 on
widely used social media platforms, such as Twitter,83 Insta-
gram,84 and Facebook.85 Bette Midler, for example, emphasized
the poor reality of music streaming services, as she tweeted,
“!Spotify and @Pandora have made it impossible for songwrit-
ers to earn a living: three months streaming on Pandora,
8O<57O<83 plays $ +<<8K<<K”86 Another prime example of artists
receiving dismally low royalties, even when a song may be li-
censed appropriately, is exemplified by the songwriter Aloe
Blacc’s recent reportO where he stated:
Avicii’s release “Wake Me Up/” that I co-wrote and sing, for ex-
ample, was the most streamed song in Spotify history and the
78. While Deezer currently has over 40 million tracks of music and 6 million
users globally, Spotify has 70 million free users and 30 million paid subscrib-
ers, Apple Music has 15 million subscribers, and Tidal has 4.2 million. See
Shelby Carbenter, Deezerm Music Streaming Service from France, Launches
in US for First Time, FORBES (July 19, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/shel-
bycarpenter/2016/07/19/streaming-service-deezer-enters-us-challenges-
spotify-pandora/#193d2dc228b9. Pandora reported it had 79.4 million monthly
active listeners in the first quarter of this year. Id.
79. See id.
80. Many artists, including Taylor Swift and Adele, who are worried, and
rightfully so, of not receiving adequate payment for their musical compositions
on digital sites, have abstained from joining major digital music providers like
Spotify and Deezer. See Paul Resnikoff, Why Prince Hated Spotify, YouTube,
SoundCloud, Apple, Music, Deezer, and Rdio, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Apr. 21,
2016), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2016/04/21/why-prince-hated-
spotify/.
81. SeeU.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. supra note 12, at 75.
82. See id.
83. TWITTER, https://twitter.com (last visited Jan. 16, 2017).
84. INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com (last visited Jan. 16, 2017).
85. FACEBOOK, supra note 41.
86. See @BetteMidler, TWITTER (Apr. 4, 2014, 5:47 PM), https://twit-
ter.com/bettemidler/status/452200886970769408?lang=en.
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13th most played song on Pandora since its release in 2013,
with more than 168 million streams in the US. And yet, that
yielded only $12,359 in Pandora domestic royalties?which
were then split among three songwriters and our publishers.
In return for co-writing a ma=or hit songO I’ve earned less than
$4,000 domestically from the largest digital music service.87
Music streaming providers’ response to the angered artists88
has been that while they pay royalties to performers for the pub-
lic performance of sound recordings, terrestrial radio89 does not,
so these royalties must be considered.90 In fact, radio airplay is
87. Aloe Blacc, Streaming Services Need to Pay Songwriters Fairly, WIRED
(Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/11/aloe-blacc-pay-songwriters.
88. For their part, the digital music services deny that they are the cause of
the decline in songwriter income. See Andy Gensler, Bette Midler Disparages
Pandora, Spotify Over Artist Compensation, BILLBOARD (Apr. 6, 2014),
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/digital-and-mobile/6039697/bette-
midler-disparages-pandora-spotify-over-artist. Pandora, for instance, chal-
lenged the numbers cited by Midler and Blacc by publicizing the total amounts
paid for all rights to perform the songs, including sound recording rights, stat-
ing that they paid +6O8II USZ in royalties in Midler’s case and over +:7IOIII
USZ for the plays of “Wake Me Up/”K Id.; Alison Kosik, TBF 8%YY>A/C _/H ‘"/R
&A)%_&FH’ 1.(>H .D K%'AJ R.Z_>&AF', CNN MONEY (Nov. 17, 2014),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/11/17/media/aloe-blacc-music-royalties; see also
U.S. COPYRIGHTOFF. supra note 12, at 76.
89. Terrestrial radio has a limited broadcast market. See Key Differences
Between Terrestrial and Internet Radio, TALKTAINMENT RADIO, http://talktain-
mentradio.com/wordpress/key-differences-between-terrestrial-and-internet-
radio/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2017). The waves of terrestrial radio emanate to a
reserved terrestrial area and can only reach the population within the trans-
mission area. Id. This is much smaller in scope to internet radio, which would
reach a global population. Id.
90. The United States is one of the few industrialized countries that does
not have broadcast performance rights for sound recordings. See Public Perfor-
mance Right for Sound Recordings, FUTURE OF MUSIC (Nov. 5, 2013),
https://www.futureofmusic.org/article/fact-sheet/public-performance-right-
sound-recordings. As FUTURE OFMUSIC asserts:
This means that foreign broadcasters pay royalties to song-
writers/composers and performers. But since there is no re-
ciprocal right in the U.S., foreign performance rights societies
cannot distribute these royalties to American performers.
This leaves tens of millions of dollars of royalties on the table
annually rather than in the pockets of American artists.
Id. New media platforms that broadcast digital performances?webcasters,
satellite radio, cable subscriber, channels?obtain licenses from ASCAP, BMI,
and SESAC, which compensate the songwriters and publishers of the music
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considered a public performance, in which only songwriters may
generate performance royalties.91 So, terrestrial broadcasters
(AM or FM stations) only pay the songwriters, as opposed to per-
formers or sound recording copyright owners.92 It is not fair,
however, for music streamers to use terrestrial broadcasters as
an example because streaming services often have a global reach
with some type of fee.
II. THEU.S. CLASS ACTION SYSTEM
This Part will examine the U.S. class action system under Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), specifically
detailing the types of cases that can be brought, who can repre-
sent the class, and what damages are available to the class mem-
bers. This Part will also discuss the legal and financial ad-
vantages and disadvantages of these components, which will be
further elaborated on in Part III of this Note.
Rule 23 of the FRCP governs class action proceedings in the
United States.93 The FRCP govern civil procedure for civil law-
suits in the federal system, and federal courts must apply state
substantive law where state law is in question.94 The federal
courts almost always apply the FRCP, however, because alt-
hough U.S. states may determine their own rules, which apply
in state courts, most U.S. states have adopted rules based on the
FRCP.95 Important aspects of the U.S. class action system out-
lined in Rule 23 of the FRCP are that: Q<Pmembers can “opt-out,”
(2) anyone may act as a class representative so long as they are
competent, (3) each party bears its own legal costs, and (4) puni-
tive damages are permitted.96 In the United States, class actions
can be filed on numerous grounds. For example, the quintessen-
tial types of class action are lawsuits brought by a class of plain-
tiffs affected by environmental issues (i.e., preventing pollution
they play. Id. Terrestrial radio, however, does not do so and, as FUTURE OF
MUSIC assertsO “terrestrial radio is the only medium that broadcasts music but
does not compensate artists or record labels for the performance.” Id.
91. Ken Consor, 1B_& a.% bAH/’& Know About Radio Royalties, SONGTRUST
(Aug. 6, 2014), http://blog.songtrust.com/publishing-tips-2/what-you-didnt-
know-about-radio-royalties/.
92. Id.
93. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Frequently Asked Questions About Class Actions, CALI,
http://www.classactionlitigation.com/faq.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2017).
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or contamination of their property), financial issues (i.e., preda-
tory lending or financial securities fraud or misconduct), and
civil rights issues, such as racial segregation in the 1950s or sex-
ual discrimination.97 Artists who are adversely affected by digi-
tal music streamers may use this tool in the United States, as
their claim could qualify as a financial issue in which such art-
ists have fallen victim to misconduct Qfor digital streamers’ failL
ure to obtain proper licenses).
In the United States, members of a class action lawsuit do not
“=oin” the litigationK98 Instead, they decide whether or not to “opt-
outK”99Once a claim has been filed and a court certifies that there
are too many class members to be named in the litigation, a no-
tice will be issued to each member of the class, giving each mem-
ber the opportunity to decide whether they want to participate
in the litigation.100 Unless a potential class member specifically
opts out, they will automatically be included in the litigation and
its consequences.101 If, however, they chose to opt-out, they can-
not benefit from any award or settlement achieved by the litiga-
tion.102 This is in contrast to an “opt-in” systemO where each
member has to take affirmative action to “opt-in” to the litigaL
tion.103 It could be argued that “opt-in” systems are bestO as only
those who are proactive will benefit.104 “2pt-out” regimesO howL
ever, are also beneficial, as they provide equal protection to each
affected class member by informing them of the allegations
97. Common Types of Class Action Lawsuits, LAWINFO, http://resources.law-
info.com/class-action/common-types-of-class-action-lawsuits.html (last visited
Oct. 18, 2017).
98. See CALI, supra note 96.
99. See id.
100. See id. Along with notice regarding the class action lawsuit received in
the mail, there will be instructions about how to opt-out of the lawsuit. See
How To Opt Out Of A Class Action Lawsuit, WIKIHOW, https://www.wiki-
how.com/Opt-Out-of-a-Class-Action-Lawsuit (last visited Oct. 18, 2017). If, for
some reason, opt-out paperwork is not included, anyone could find such paper-
work online, as a class action lawsuit usually has a website with all necessary
paperwork available. Id. One should consult a lawyer before opting out, how-
ever, because such an action would mean that they would not be able to par-
ticipate in any award granted by the court. Id.
101. See Linda Visser, 1B_& b.F' A& KF_/ &. “O+&-O%&” .D _ !>_'' "J&A./#,
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made by the suit, while also informing potential class members
of their right to “opt-outK”105
There is also an “ade'uacy-of-representation” re'uirement as
to who can serve as a class representative.106 In order to serve as
a class representative, an individual must share interests of the
class members that are so interrelated that the remaining class
members will be fairly and adequately protected in their ab-
sence.107 In order to “fairly and ade'uately protect” the classO the
class representative must “represent the classO protect the interL
ests of the class, understand the litigation, keep class counsel
informed, cooperate and attend events when required, vigor-
ously prosecute the litigation, provide notice to the class, and
hire lawyers eSperienced in class action litigationK”108 The bene-
fit of this requirement is that class representatives will better
protect the interests of the class if they are similarly situated. It
may be argued, however, that a class representative may choose
individual gain to the detriment of the class, regardless of their
similar loss. Although a class representative may choose individ-
ual gain, this concern is often laid to rest when the class repre-
sentative chooses the most experienced counsel possible, to the
court’s satisfactionK109
The U.S. system provides monetary advantages to class action
members as well, as it is free to join a class action.110 U.S. attor-
neys are usually awarded a 25@35 percent fee out of the total
class recovery (i.e., the total monetary award).111 This means
that attorneys pay all of the fees up-front and class members
only bear a relatively small hit to their overall recovery if they
105. See Opting Out of a Class Action, https://www.clas-
saction.org/learn/class-action-opt-out (last visited Sept. 19, 2017).
106. See Anna Prakash, Class-Representative Adequacy: Preparing for and




107. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
108. See What is a Class Representative/Lead Plaintiff?, STARR AUSTEN &
MILLER, LLP (Sept. 19, 2017), http://www.starrausten.com/resources/what-is-
a-class-representative-lead-plaintiff/ [hereinafter AUSTEN&MILLER, LLP].
109. See id.
110. See Does Joining A Class Action Lawsuit Cost Me Anything?, CLASS
ACTION, https://www.classaction.com/faqs/joining-class-action-lawsuit-cost-an-
ything/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2017) [hereinafter CLASS ACTION].
111. See id.
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win their case.112 If the United States had a loser-pays regime,
many litigants would be deterred from bringing suit, as class ac-
tion lawsuits usually involve multiple consumers with nominal
damages, who would not want to risk paying expensive legal fees
for their comparatively smaller loss. A loser-pays regime, how-
ever, would help deter frivolous litigation.
Finally, in the United States, class action litigants have a
plethora of damages that they can seek, including statutory and
punitive damages, as well as non-monetary injunctive and de-
claratory relief.113 Punitive damages serve the important social
benefit of imposing harsh penalties on producers of products who
may have large cash flows.114 If such producers are not hit with
a fine big enough to catch their attention or hurt their wallet,
they may continue taking advantage of the small consumer.
III. GROUP LITIGATION IN THEUNITEDKINGDOM POST
ENACTMENT OF THE CRA
In contrast to the U.S. class action system, the U.K. system,
under the CRA, has proven to be far more restrictive. This Part
will detail these restrictive aspects, specifically addressing who
may act as a class representative, who must pay for the litiga-
tion, who determines the outcome, and what damages may be
awarded.
The U.S.-style class action culture has emerged in the United
Dingdom as a “collective actionsO” wheremultiple claimants with
similar claims seek a remedy against the same defendant(s).115
In 2015, collective actions were incorporated into the UKDK’s curL
rent system by the CRAO which “enables consumers and busiL
nesses to bring a private action for damages for losses suffered
as a result of an infringement of EU or U.K. competition law on
112. See id.
113. See Class/Collective Actions in France: Overview, PRACTICAL LAW (Nov.
1, 2016), http://us.practicallaw.com/1-618-0240#a353055 [hereinafter
PRACTICAL LAW].
114. Robert Clifford, Positive Benefit in Punitive Damages, CHICAGOTRIBUNE
(Apr. 17, 1993), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1993-04-
17/news/9304170165_1_punitive-damages-tort-reform-health-care.
115. The UKDK’s current rules for collective litigationO together with other proL
cedural and substantive features available to litigants, create a system distinct
from other civil code jurisdictions. See Collective Actions: UK Guide, supra note
<4K As of lateO howeverO the UKDK’s procedures have been under reviewK Id. At
the EU level, initiatives are under way to reform the procedures available for
collective consumer and competition claims. Id.
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an 0opt-out’ basis, i.e. on behalf of an entire class of claimants . .
K without the need to identify every individual claimantK”116 The
CRA is the principal source of law in the United Kingdom for
bringing a claim in multi-party litigation (i.e., litigation involv-
ing multiple claimants) which is to be a tool for, but not limited
to, competition law claims, personal injury claims, and pension
disputes.117 The CRA provides for an opt-in system where a class
approved by the United Kingdom Competition Appeal Tribunal
(CAT) may bring a claim for potential compensation.118 The CRA
maintains a “loser-pays” cost rule, where only a judge can deter-
mine an outcome limited to nominal damages only.119
Although the collective actions system sounds similar to the
U.S. class action law, there have been crucial protective
measures put into place which distinguish the UKDK’s collective
actions system significantly from the U.S. class action law. Spe-
cificallyO as a result of the CRA’s passageO the ma=or differences
between the two class action systems, as exemplified in
Ashurst’s120 Quickguides, are as follows: (1) opt-in versus opt-
out, (2) who may act as a class representative, (3) who pays, (4)
whether the case will be brought before a judge or a jury, and (5)
what type of damages will be permitted as recovery?if recovery
is permitted.121
In the United Kingdom, the opt-in system, as previously de-
scribed, is not available to all class action litigants.122 With the
passage of the CRA, citizens of the United Kingdom may be sub-
=ect to litigation on either an “opt-in” or “opt-out” basisO at the
116. Collective Actions: UK Guide, supra note 18. The CRA came into force on
October 1, 2015. See id.
117. Frances Murphy, Omar Shah & Roderick Farningham, Class/collective
Actions in the UK (England and Wales) Overview, PRACTICAL LAW,
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/6-618-0351?transitionType=De-
fault&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1 (last visited Oct. 18,
2017).




122. See COMPETITION APPEAL TRIBUNAL, http://www.catribunal.org.uk (last
visited Sept. 19, 2017); Collective Actions: UK Guide, supra note 18; The Basics,
OUT-LAW.COM, http://www.out-law.com/page-5811 (last visited Nov. 7, 2016)
[hereinafter OUT-LAW.COM].
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election of the CAT.123 The problem, however, is that only certain
categories of lawsuits will be permissible to proceed on an opt-
out basis, with all collective actions lawsuits proceeding on an
opt-in basis.124 The CAT will not even consider whether collec-
tive actions can be brought on an “opt-out” basis unless the claim
deals with a breach of competition law.125 This means that while
class actions can be filed on numerous grounds,126 citizens of the
United Dingdom have a limited scope in the type of “opt-out”
class action claims they can bring. The CAT will include an as-
sessment of “both the suitability of the proposed class repreL
sentative and the suitability of the claims for inclusion in collec-
tive proceedingsK”127 Artists who have been cheated out of digital
royalties do not fit into the 0competition law’ categoryO and thus
any collective actions litigation initiated to advocate for artists’
rights is forced to proceed on an opt-in basis, leaving many art-
ists, who should be receiving a cut of a potential settlement, out
of the proceedings altogether.128
The CAT rules, which went into effect on the same day as the
CRA, also specify who may serve as a class representative.129
Rule 78 specifically states that the CAT will authorize the class
representative:
Only if the Tribunal considers that it is just and reasonable
(i.e., whether the applicant would fairly and adequately act in
123. The CAT, which is a specialist judicial body with cross-disciplinary ex-
pertise in law, economics, business, and accountancy, hears and decides cases.
See id.
124. See Collective Actions: UK Guide, supra note 18.
125. SeeOUT-LAW.COM, supra note 122; see also Collective Actions: UK Guide,
supra note 18. Chapters I and II of the Competition Act of 1998 and the Enter-
prise Act of 2002 regulate anti-competitive behavior which may affect trade
within the United Kingdom. See OUT-LAW.COM, supra note 122; see also Col-
lective Actions: UK Guide, supra note 18. Anti-competitive behavior whose ef-
fect may reach not just within the United Kingdom, but beyond to other states
within the European Union, are prohibited by Articles 101 and 102 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. See OUT-LAW.COM, supra
note 122; see also Collective Actions: UK Guide, supra note 18.
126. See Are US Style Class Actions Really Coming to the United Kingdom?,
LEXOLOGY (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/de-
tail.aspx?g=978bda29-210f-4c05-8155-8ab5f87a28e9 [hereinafter LEXOLOGY].
127. See Collective Actions: UK Guide, supra note 18.
128. See OUT-LAW.COM, supra note 122.
129. See The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, 2015 No. 1648, (Eng.)
http://www.catribunal.org.uk/files/The_Competition_Appeal_Tribu-
nal_Rules_2015.pdf [hereinafter Appeal Tribunal Rules].
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the interests of the class members, has a material interest, is
most suitable to representO would be able to pay defendant’s
recoverable costs if ordered to do so, and would be able to sat-
isfy any undertaking as to damages required by the tribunal)
for the applicant to act as class representative in the collective
proceedings.130
The CAT provides various factors to decide whether to author-
ize the proposed representative, including whether that person:
a) Would fairly and adequately act in the interests of the class
members;
b) Does not have, in relation to the common issues for the
class members, a material interest that is in conflict with the
interests of class members;
c) If there is more than one applicant seeking approval to act
as the class representative in respect of the same claims, would
be the most suitable;
d) Will be able to pay the defendant’s recoverable costs if orL
dered to do so; and
e) Where an interim injunction is sought, will be able to sat-
isfy any undertaking as to damages required by the Tribu-
nal.131
In addition to the above factors, potential conflicts of interests
may prevent someone, such as a law firm or a third-party
founder, from being deemed a suitable class representative.132
This means that although the possibility of approval has been
left open, how the CAT will approach this question in practice
remains unknown.
As for who bears the cost of litigation in collective actions law-
suitsO the United Dingdom chose to retain the “loser-pays” costs
rule.133 The loser-pays costs rule means that those who bring un-
successful cases will be liable for costs, although the represented
individuals or businesses will not themselves be liable.134 The
United Kingdom seems very wary of introducing a full blown
0U.S.-style class action regimeK’135 Retaining the “loser-pays”
130. See id. at 45, r. 78(2).
131. See id.
132. See id.; Collective Actions: UK Guide, supra note 18.
133. See Collective Actions: UK Guide, supra note 18.
134. See id.
135. See id.
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costs rule is an attempt to prevent an overflow of unmeritorious
litigation.136 The UKDK’s rationale is that if the unsuccessful
party is to bear the cost of litigation, then only those litigants
with truly meritorious claims will come forth, as they will be rel-
atively certain of receiving some level of damages.137 In the
United States, the normal costs rule is that each party bears its
own legal costs.138
Bot only is the “opt-in”J “opt-out” barrier likely to prevent reL
covery for similarly positioned artist plaintiffsO but the “loser-
pays” rule will surely have deterrent effects on litigants, who
will be financially incapable of bringing a claim on their own, for
fear of being forced to foot the bill of the potentially exorbitant
litigation costs. The potential cost of litigation139 against major
companies, like Spotify or Deezer, collecting millions of dollars
of revenue for tens of millions of subscribers each year, could be
exorbitant.140 Because it is currently unclear how the CAT will
approach the question of who may be seen as an adequate class
representative, there is much debate about what will happen if
the CAT chooses a restrictive route in their analysis.141 Various
136. Unmeritorious claims not only waste the parties’ timeO but they flood the
court systems as well. See Frivolous Lawsuits, NFIB, (Sept. 16, 2015),
http://www.nfib.com/content/issues/legal/frivolous-lawsuits-326/; see also Col-
lective Actions: UK Guide, supra note 18. The United Kingdom is concerned
with frivolous lawsuits, and rightfully so, as the cost of litigation can be stag-
gering. See Collective Actions: UK Guide, supra note 18.
137. See Collective Actions: UK Guide, supra note 18.
138. See id.
139. Although the cost of litigation in the United States is by far the highest
compared to the rest of the world, the Institute for Legal Reform found that
liability costs in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Denmark have risen be-
tween 13 percent and 25 percent per year since 2008. See U.S. CHAMBER INST.
FOR LEGAL REFORM, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF LITIGATION COSTS:
CANADA, EUROPE, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATES, at iii (June 2013),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/up-
loads/sites/1/ILR_NERA_Study_International_Liability_Costs-update.pdf
[hereinafter U.S. CHAMBER INST.VK In factO “features of the legal environment in
each country are highly correlated with litigation costs, implying that changes
to the liability system may have a substantial effect on costs. A common law
(rather than civil law) tradition and a high number of lawyers per capita are
strong indicators of higher litigation costsK” Id. at iv. The United Kingdom
maintains one of the most expensive legal systems in the world. Id. at v.
140. See Carbenter, supra note 78; see also U.S. CHAMBER INST., supra note
139.
141. See Collective Actions: UK Guide, supra note 18.
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legal practitioners in the United Kingdom have voiced their con-
cerns as to possible approaches the CAT may take in deciding
future cases, as it will directly impact whether individuals feel
confident to bring a claim, knowing that they may have to foot
the bill for expensive litigation proceedings should they take on
the responsibility of leading a class. It is alarming that law
firms, third party funders, and special purpose vehicles may not
be suitable representatives.142 If such parties could potentially
be unsuitable, who would ever be expected, or willing, to take on
a significant risk of fronting the costs of litigation when their
individual damages are exponentially smaller?143
In addition to uncertainties about how the UKDK’s “opt-out” vs.
“opt-in” distinction will applyO the potential for the CAT to apply
a very narrow approach to who may serve as a class representa-
tive for collective actions, and the potentially deterring “loser-
pays” cost ruleO there is the added restriction that the outcome
of collective actions are not to be determined by a non-partisan
jury, but only by a judge.144 Limiting collective actions to a sce-
nario where only a judge can determine an outcome could be dis-
astrous for litigants on both sides of a lawsuit. When a case is
limited to one individual’s decisionO there is the chance that that
individual may maintain a very narrow viewpoint and may not
be adept at deciding the issue entirely on their own, and vice
versa.145 It is vital for litigants to be ensured the fairest proce-
dures possibleK A =ury not only serves as a check on the =udge’s
decision, but brings fresh insight from various backgrounds,
142. See id.
143. Although the CRA provides the option for CAT to order that all or part
of any unclaimed damages be paid to the class representative in opt-out pro-
ceedings, with respect to costs and expenses incurred by the representative in
the proceedings, it is unclear how this discretion will be exercised in practice.
See id. As Ashurts’ article assertsO “WtVhe success of the new regime may thereL
fore depend on the appetite of litigation funders to support class representa-
tives, the mechanisms employed to mitigate the financial risk they face and
the scope for claimant representatives to recover a return when bringing such
actionsK” See Major Overhaul of UK Competition Litigation Regime Enters into
Force Today, ASHURST (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-
insights/legal-updates/major-overhaul-of-uk-competition-litigation-regime-en-
ters-into-force-today/ [hereinafter UK Competition Litigation].
144. See Collective Actions: UK Guide, supra note 18.
145. See Thomas Dalton, What are the Advantages and Disadvantages of
Having a Jury vs. Having a Judge Decide a Court Case?, QUORA (Feb. 18, 2014),
https://www.quora.com/What-are-the-advantages-and-disadvantages-of-hav-
ing-a-jury-vs-having-a-judge-decide-a-court-case.
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which may help to explain and justify a defendant or plaintiff’s
perspective.146
HinallyO as outlined in the CRAO the UKDK’s collective actions
system does not award punitive damages.147 Wronged musicians
do not fall into the category of plaintiffs who may be awarded
punitive damages, as they are not commercial consumers.
Therefore, they will be limited in their recovery based on the
United Kingdom’s unwillingness to award punitive damages in
all cases, and instead be left with only nominal monetary dam-
ages.148
Although the CRA was only passed within the last two years,
it is safe to say that its restrictions on collective action lawsuits
will make artists less likely to challenge digital streaming com-
panies who have either failed to acquire licenses or pay proper
royalties. The opt-in restriction, the CAT prerequisites for who
may act as a class representativeO the “loser-pays” winner’s costs
approach, the non-jury requirement, and the failure to award
punitive damages will certainly further the United Kingdom’s
objective of deterring frivolous or speculative claims. It will also
prove damaging for artists, who may be left without the neces-
sary tools to vindicate their rights.149
IV. GROUP LITIGATION IN FRANCEUNDER THE LOI HAMON
Hrance’s class action systemO under the Coi Hamon, is even
more restrictive than the United Kingdom’s systemK This Part
will detail this restrictiveness, specifically the opt-in system,
who may act as a class representative, what court has jurisdic-
tion, and the type of compensation available to litigants.
Just one year before collective action law emerged in the
United Kingdom, the Loi Hamon was enacted in France in
March 2014, in relation to consumer and competition law mat-
ters.150 Since the Coi Famon’s enactment on 2ctober <O :I<8O
146. See id.
147. Collective Actions: UK Guide, supra note 18.
148. See Punitive Damages, THOMSONREUTERS, http://uk.practicallaw.com/7-
107-7085 (last visited Jan. 16, 2017).
149. See LEXOLOGY, supra note 126.
150. Lesur, supra note 23.
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only six151 class action lawsuits have been brought throughout
France.152
The following conditions must be satisfied in order to bring any
class action under the Loi Hamon: (1) two or more consumers
must be placed in a similar or identical situation; (2) the con-
sumers must suffer individual financial losses resulting from a
tangible damage; (3) the losses must arise from the same breach
of legal or contractual obligation(s) by one or several profes-
sional(s), the claim must be in connection with the sale of goods
or provision of services, or as a result of the same anti-competi-
tive practices; and (4) only approved153 national associations can
bring class actions (i.e., Familles de France and Union Nationale
des Associations Familiales [Unaf]).154 The fact that only an ap-
proved national association may bring a class action is the most
limiting prong, as there is no approved association that includes
the rights of wronged musicians.155 HurthermoreO Hrance’s class
action laws under the Loi Hamon are further restricted by the
151. To date, there is no available case law pertaining to the Loi Hamon. See
Alexandre Biard, Class Action Developments in France, STANFORD (Aug. 2016),
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/FRANCE_0.pdf. The five class actions that are currently pending are:
(1) Association UFC Que Choisir v. Foncia (October 2014), (2) Association
CLCV v. Axia and AGIPI (October 2014), (3) Association Confédération Natio-
nale du Logement (CNL) v. Immobiliére 3F (November 2014), (4) Association
Confédération Syndicale des Familles v. Paris Habitat-OPH, (5) Association
Familles Rurales v. SFR (May 2015). Id. In addition to these five pending law-
suits, it is alleged that Association Familles Rurales has filed a class action
against a camping companyO “Manoir de Der An PoulK” Id.
152. As Lionel Lesur asserts:
Class actions are clearly not as popular as had been hoped,
at least not yet. Indeed, of the (only) six procedures brought
before the French Courts, four were brought around one
month after the law came into effect, and all relate to con-
sumer mattersK 2ne action led to a (: million settlement inL
tended to compensate the damages suffered by 100,000 con-
sumers who had been required to pay excessive charges for
elevator tele-surveillance.
See Lesur, supra note 23.
153. To be approved as a national association, the group must comply with
the conditions set out by Article R. 411-1 of the French Consumer Code. See
Lesur, supra note 23. Only fifteen associations are currently authorized to
bring class actions. Id.
154. See LATHAM&WATKINS, supra note 19; Lesur, supra note 23.
155. See Lesur, supra note 23.
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“opt-in” versus “opt-out” distinctionO who may act as a class repL
resentative, and how compensation is awarded.
Hrance’s restrictive class action laws are based only on an “opt-
in” system versus an “opt-out” systemK156 As previously dis-
cussedO an “opt-in” system will only allow named litigants157 to
benefit from any potential settlement or award.158 This means
that potential litigants who should recover, but are either una-
ware of the pending action or do not opt-in, will not receive any
part of the settlement or award, should there be any.159
Who may bring a French class action is also significantly lim-
ited in scope.160 The French law entitles only accredited con-
sumer associations to represent consumers and bring a class ac-
tion before the courts.161 For an association to qualify, it must be
effective and publicly active in pursuing consumer interests,
have existed at least one year, and have a threshold of individu-
ally paid-up members.162 The problem with this criteria, how-
ever, is that there are currently only fifteen clearly identified
consumer associations who may bring a class action due to this
restrictiveness, with no currently approved association encom-
passing musicians on that list.163
Moreover, in France, only high courts of first instance have ju-
risdiction over class action procedures.164 If the defendant is lo-
cated in France, a suit is limited to the court that is territorially
competent and closest to where the defendant is established.165
If the defendant, however, is located outside of France, the Paris
High Court of First Instance, known as the Tribunal de grande
instance de Paris, is the only competent court.166 This means
156. See The French Class Action and the English Group Litigation Order:
Two Collective Actions Restoring Equality of Arms Between Victims, LE PETIT
JURISTE (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.lepetitjuriste.fr/droit-compare/the-french-
class-action-and-the-english-group-litigation-order-two-collective-actions-re-
storing-equality-of-arms-between-victims/.
157. See Visser, supra note 101.
158. This will allow for more similarly situated individuals/plaintiffs to ben-
efit from a ruling in their favor. See UK Competition Litigation, supra note 143.
159. See LATHAM&WATKINS, supra note 19.
160. See Collective Actions: UK Guide, supra note 18.
161. See LE PETIT JURISTE, supra note 156.
162. Lesur, supra note 23.
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that artists from France are limited to the jurisdiction of the
Paris High Court of First Instance should they want to bring a
claim against digital music streaming companies headquartered
outside of France.167 Limiting jurisdictions in which a litigant
can bring a claim could pose as a disservice to artists who want
to choose a different venue, for whatever reason.
Finally, courts in France do not award punitive damages.168
French courts have declared that punitive damages may be
awarded, so long as the punitive damage award is not dispropor-
tionate to the damage caused to the plaintiffs by the breach of
contract.169 The entire purpose of a class action lawsuit is to com-
pensate the pecuniary loss of victims, which is why damages are
limited to the loss suffered.170 This means that musicians who
have been wronged are limited in their recovery. The inability to
win punitive damages also means that digital music streaming
companiesO who are taking advantage of utiliRing musician’s
compositions without acquiring proper licenses, will not be de-
terred by harsh damages.171
In short, the restrictiveness of the opt-in system, who may act
as a class representative, what court has jurisdiction, and the
type of compensation available under the Loi Hamon is so limit-
ing that artists have little hope in their battle against digital
music streaming companies. As such, immediate action must be
taken to ade'uately protect artists’ rights against exploitation.
V. SOLUTION
While the United States provides flexibility for litigants to file
class action lawsuits, the United Kingdom and France are overly
restrictive, which harms the interests of artists and devalues
their work. This Part proposes a solution to this restrictiveness,
calling for legal reform in the United Kingdom and France where
167. See id. at 2.
168. See Ron Soffer et al., The Recognition of Punitive Damages by French
Courts: TBF P/H .D &BF “8%/A&A$F b_0_CF 1_(”, SOFFER, www.nysba.org/Sec-
tions/International/Seasonal...24/Panel_24_Soffer_paper.html. Punitive dam-
ages are often larger than nominal damages. See PRACTICAL LAW, supra note
113.
169. Soffer, supra note 168; PRACTICAL LAW, supra note 113.
170. Because class actions are geared towards compensating the pecuniary
loss of victims, moral damages cannot be compensated in a class action. See
PRACTICAL LAW, supra note 113.
171. See id.
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they respectively alter their laws to mirror the U.S. class action
model.
A. Need for a Solution
The digital delivery of music is currently at an all-time high.
Artists, however, are financially suffering as a result of it, as
digital providers, such as Spotify and Rhapsody, digitally stream
their music without negotiating proper licensing fees. Class ac-
tion litigation is the most powerful tool artists have to assure
that their rights are protected. The U.S. class action system,
which allows for Q<P members to “opt-outO” Q:P anyone to act as a
class representative so long as they are competent, (3) each party
to bear its own legal costs, and (4) punitive damages,172 provides
artists proper access to the court system and effective legal rem-
edies. The same, however, cannot be said for artists in the
United Dingdom and HranceO where Q<P members must “opt-in”
to litigation, (2) class representatives are more limited, (3) the
losing party pays litigation costs, and (4) punitive damages are
not permitted. In order to safeguard the financial situation of all
artists, the United Kingdom and France must adopt a class ac-
tion regime that is the same as the U.S. system. If the United
Kingdom and France were to do so, it would insure artists amore
optimal tool to vindicate their rights.
B. Implementation
As class action lawsuits have proven to be successful in the
United States, countries, such as the United Kingdom and
France, who have budding class action laws, should modify their
current class action legal models, as the U.S. class action model
seems to be the most effective means for exploited artists to ad-
vocate for their rights and receive appropriate digital royalty
revenue against powerful international music streaming provid-
ers.173 The United Kingdom and France could reform their cur-
rent legislation to provide for Q<P an “opt-out” regimeO Q:P anyone
to act as a class representative so long as they are competent
172. See CALI, supra note 96.
173. As of 2016, iHeartRadio has 85 million registered users, Apple Music
has 54.5 million subscribers, and 8tracks (an internet radio) has 17 million
monthly active users. See Craig Smith, How Many Users Do Spotify, Pandora,
iHeart Radio, Apple Music and Other Top Music Streaming have?, DMR (July
24, 2016), http://expandedramblings.com/index.php/how-many-people-use-
spotify-pandora-music-streaming-services/.
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QiKeKO allow for eSploited individuals who do not fit into a “conL
sumer” category to bring suit against digital music providers
who are selling their music databases without properly obtain-
ing licenses for each individual track or album), (3) each party
to bear its own legal costs, and (4) allow for punitive damages.
Although the United Kingdom and France have not adopted
the U.S. class action system in its entirety,174 the United King-
dom and France have already opened the door towards reflecting
the U.S. class action model in their own legal systems. Further,
since the United Kingdom and France have adopted such legis-
lation within the last four years,175 they are clearly open to re-
formK Bow that a few years have passed since the UKDK’s and
Hrance’s respective laws have been adoptedO it is as great a time
as ever for them to reconsider how such laws should be struc-
tured, whether that be by passing an amendment or adopting
new legislation entirely. It is imperative for them to further
these efforts to fully adopt the U.S. class action model.
CONCLUSION
Despite the small group176 of musicians speaking out and post-
ing on social media against music streamers who pay out dismal
revenues or fail to acquire proper licenses, many artists stand to
suffer in the future if this continues. Thus, class action litigation
is an important tool, if not the most important tool, for artists to
advocate for themselves and other similarly situated artists to
make sure that they are receiving the monies they are due. Such
major digital streaming services take advantage of less famous
artists, who may not have enough social presence to be a domi-
nating force against the major music streaming providers with
millions of subscribers.177 Class action litigation may serve as a
174. Although beyond the scope of this Note, recent scholars have commented
on the flaws of class action litigation and how it has evolved over time in the
United States. See Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them:
Rethinking the American Class Action, EMORY UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW,
http://law.emory.edu/elj/content/volume-64/issue-2/thrower-symposium-arti-
cles/rethinking-american-class-action.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2017).
175. Collective Actions: UK Guide, supra note 18; LATHAM&WATKINS, supra
note 19.
176. See Paul Resnikoff, 16 Artists That Are Now Speaking Out Against
6&(F_0A/CL, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.digitalmu-
sicnews.com/2013/12/02/artistspiracy/.
177. Artists who rank among the top most followed people on Facebook, In-
stagram, and Twitter arguably have more leverage against digital music
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tool for artists who do not have as high of an income asmusicians
on global top forty lists, so that they may assert their rights
without fear of the potential costs of pursuing litigation against
powerful music streaming providers. Therefore, it is imperative
for the United Kingdom and France to provide for a system in
which their respective class action laws can incorporate (1) an
“opt-out” regimeO Q:P anyone to act as a class representative so
long as they are competent, (3) each party to bear its own legal
costs, and (4) allow for punitive damages.
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